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COMMUNITY HOUSING TRUST: A FAIR




Few people would argue with the notion that "a person's quality of
life depends largely on where he or she lives."1 Indeed, one's home is
generally the source of present contentment, past memories, and
future expectations. Yet for many individuals, a quality home is no
more than an improbable dream. This stark reality is of particular
relevance to those who live with a major mental illness. People who
suffer from mental illnesses have a long history of inadequate housing
2
options, a trend that continues to the present. People who live with
mental illnesses of any kind are often relegated to the least attractive
areas, where conditions are typically unpleasant and downright
dangerous.3 Often times, however, these individuals are the more
fortunate members of the mentally ill community. Faced with
inadequate community-based health systems, exclusionary zoning
policies, and a lack of financial resources, many mentally ill people end
up in substandard housing or even homeless. A recent study reveals
that roughly twenty to twenty-five percent of the single adult homeless
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1. Arlene S. Kanter, A Home of One's Own: The Fair Housing Amendments
Act of 1988 and Housing Discrimination Against People with Mental Disabilities, 43
AM. U. L. REV. 925, 928 (1994).
2. Id. at 929.
3. Nancy K. Rhoden, The Limits of Liberty: Deinstitutionalization,
Homelessness, and Libertarian Theory, 31 EMORY L.J. 375, 388 (1982).
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population suffers from some form of severe, chronic mental illness.4
This figure indicates that there are disproportionate numbers of
mentally ill people among the homeless population,as only four
percent of the total U.S. population suffer from a mental illness.6
The fact that so many mentally ill individuals are either homeless or
live in substandard housing is a serious public health concern. Just as
retro-viral medication is vital to individuals with HIV for their medical
well-being, proper housing resources are likewise essential to the
health of the mentally ill.7  Quality housing in reasonably safe
neighborhoods is arguably just as important, if not more so, than any
other therapy they may receive. In fact, some experts on homelessness
"have observed that the mentally ill need decent shelter as much or
more than they need additional mental health services, because their
therapeutic and survival needs are inseparable and because
'pathologies of place compound disorders of mind."'8  Housing,
therefore, is an issue of significant importance when addressing the
health concerns of the mentally ill.
The problem of homelessness and generally inadequate housing for
the mentally ill is an enormous issue with tremendous subtlety and
complexity. It is an issue that defies comprehensive answers and
complete resolution, yet there is always progress to be made. One
such development is illustrated by a recent case, Community Housing
Trust v. Department of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs.9 In this
decision, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held that
rational basis review is an insufficient standard for discrimination cases
that fall under the auspices of the Fair Housing Amendments Act
(FHAA).0 In doing so, the court made a conscious decision to follow
a growing majority of federal circuits that require a more searching
scrutiny in deciding cases that fall under the FHAA."
4. NAT'L RES. AND TRAINING CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS AND MENTAL ILLNESS,
GET THE FACTS, at http://www.nrchmi.samhsa.gov/facts/facts-
question_3.asp (last visited April 22, 2005).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Indeed, "The rise in homelessness among the mentally ill graphically
illustrates the fact that their need for housing cannot be divorced from their need
for mental health treatment." Rhoden, supra note 3, at 415.
8. Id. at 415, 416 (quoting Baxter & Hopper, Pathologies of Place and
Disorders of Mind, HEALTH PAC/BULL., Mar.-Apr. 1980, at 21).
9. 257 F. Supp. 2d 208 (D.D.C. 2003).
10. Id. at 229.
11. Id.
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This Note will analyze the Community Housing Trust decision and
the historical context in which it arose. The analysis will begin with a
discussion of the deinstitutionalization movement of the mid-twentieth
century and how inadequate planning and exclusionary zoning policies
have frustrated the goals of this movement. The Note will then
examine the Community Housing Trust decision and compare it with
various circuit court opinions that have addressed the issue. Finally,
through an analysis of the legislative history and Supreme Court
jurisprudence regarding the Fair Housing Act (FHA) 2 and FHAA13
and a discussion of mental illness and perceived dangers to the
community, this Note will conclude that the D.C. District Court's
decision to employ a more rigorous standard is both good law and
good policy, and should be followed by the various circuits as they
continue to face this question.
I. THE DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION MOVEMENT AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES
For centuries, humanity has struggled with the question of caring for
its mentally ill population. Historically, strategies for dealing with the
"insane" or the "feeble-minded" were heavily colored by the belief
that they were possessed by demons. 4  The movement to
institutionalize them, that is, to pack the mentally ill into locked
hospital wards, was itself believed to be a humane gesture. There, at
least, they could be protected from abuse and neglect from the outside
world.'5  Over time, however, it became apparent that such
warehousing of persons was not a humane approach, and a new
movement - deinstitutionalization - arose in its stead.
The goal of the deinstitutionalization movement was, and continues
to be, to bring the mentally ill out of the oppressive hospital setting
and place them in a more mainstream community environment. 16From 1955 to 1965, the population of mental patients in hospitals
12. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1968).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1988).
14. RAYMOND L. SPRING ET AL., PATIENTS, PSYCHIATRISTS AND LAWYERS:
LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 1, 3 (2d ed. 1997).
15. Rhoden, supra note 3, at 401.
16. Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Group Homes, Shelter, and Congregate Housing:
Deinstitutionalization Policies and the NIMBY Syndrome, 21 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. J. 413, 416 (1986).
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decreased from 559,000 to 475,200.17 By 1976, that number fell to
171,000.18 While a number of factors may have contributed to the
movement, the three most significant are: (1) the exposure of the
deplorable conditions within the institutions;'9 (2) the economic
incentive to send patients away;20 and (3) the judicial movement, begun
by Judge David L. Bazelon in Lake v. Cameron,2 ' to place individuals
with mental illnesses in the "least restrictive setting.,
2
In 1958, the President of the American Psychiatric Association,
Harry Soloman, declared that conditions in psychiatric hospitals were
"bankrupt beyond remedy." 23 The horrifying conditions witnessed by
mid-century reformers "revealed the extent to which the very structure
of the asylum helped to create and perpetuate the pathology it was
designed to cure., 2 4 In short, the institutions built to improve the lives
of the mentally ill were themselves considered decidedly un-
therapeutic. 25  This exposure of these deplorable conditions was a
major driving force in the deinstitutionalization movement.
The deinstitutionalization movement was also spurred by an unusual
alliance between libertarian crusaders and fiscally conservative
• • - 26
politicians. On the one hand, new policies that liberated captive
people and made the process of involuntary commitment to asylums
more difficult were hailed as great advancements in social justice. On
the other hand, state officials focused on cost-cutting found satisfaction
in canceling plans to build new hospitals, reductions in expenditures to
support patients, and the use of land from closed hospitals for other
27
revenue-generating purposes. While some commentators have tried
17. Rhoden, supra note 3, at 402.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 380.
20. Id. at 381-382.
21. Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
22. Rhoden, supra note 3, at 420.
23. Id. at 380 (quoting Statement of Harry Solomon, as quoted in Robitscher,
Implementing the Rights of the Mentally Disabled: Judicial, Legislative and
Psychiatric Action, in MEDICAL, MORAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH
CARE 145, 146 (F. Ayd ed. 1975)).
24. Rhoden, supra note 3, at 380.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 382.
27. Id.
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to downplay the importance of the economic rationale as a driving
force in the movement,28 it clearly played a major role.
2 1
As civil libertarians, legislatures, and budget analysts worked to
reduce psychiatric inpatient numbers, the judiciary followed suit. In
general, the judiciary has supported the socioeconomic forces that
propelled the deinstitutionalization movement during the latter half of
the twentieth century, largely through use of the "least restrictive
environment" doctrine. In 1966, Judge Bazelon articulated this
doctrine in Lake v. Cameron,30 which pronounced that hospital
administrators and state officials must carefully assess less restrictive
placement options before resorting to commitment.31 The doctrine was
utilized again in Dixon v. Weinberger,32 which ordered Washington,
D.C. officials to implement community care structures so that the
rights promoted by the least restrictive environment requirement
would be meaningful.33
Along the same lines, some courts analogized involuntary hospital
commitment to criminal incarceration. 4 These cases held that such
commitment was unconstitutional unless infused with procedural due
process safeguards including notice of reasons for confinement, right to
counsel, right to trial by jury, and the consideration of less restrictive
alternatives. 5 In Jackson v. Indiana," the Supreme Court held that a
mentally ill man, found incompetent to stand trial for a criminal
offense, could not be indefinitely committed because of his
incompetency.37 The Court decreed that in such a situation, a state
must either release the individual or initiate civil proceedings for
381involuntary commitment.
28. Leonard V. Kaplan, State Control of Deviant Behavior: A Critical Essay on
Skull's Critique of Community Treatment and Deinstitutionalization, 20 ARIZ. L.
REV. 189, 203-206 (1978).
29. Rhoden, supra note 3, at 382.
30. 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
31. Id.
32. 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975).
33. Id. at 977-980.
34. See, e.g., Lessard v. Smith, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
35. Rhoden, supra note 3, at 386.
36. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
37. Id. at 738.
38. Id.
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II. IMPEDIMENTS TO THE SUCCESS OF THE DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION
MOVEMENT: POOR PLANNING, NIMBY-ISM, AND RESTRICTIVE
ZONING
As the deinstitutionalization movement was never a clearly
articulated policy from any level of government, the massive
emigration from hospitals was not adequately supported by
community-based housing programs.39 In other words, when the
roughly 338,000 individuals were released from the hospital
environment between 1955 and 1976, issues of where they would go
and who would take care of them arose. The following excerpt from
that period articulates one commentator's hope:
The institution as a means of coping with the problems of
specific sectors of our population seems at this point to have run
its course. Whether one is aged, below par intellectually or
emotionally, delinquent, alcoholic or drug addicted, the source-
and the remedy-of the problem lie in the communities where
such people come from. By bringing them back to the
community, by enlisting the good will and the desire to serve,
the ability to understand which is found in every neighborhood,
we shall meet the challenge with such groups of persons present,
and at the same time ease the financial burden of their
confinement in fixed institutions.40
Unfortunately, the benevolence and understanding supposedly
found "in every neighborhood" has yet to fully materialize. By the
1980s, some thirty years after the origins of the deinstitutionalization
movement, adequate community facilities had not yet been created .
It is thus not difficult to understand the origin of the modern mental
health crisis of inadequate housing. Massive quantities of heavily
institutionalized individuals were released from locked wards, and
many of them had nowhere to go and no one to support them. This
poor planning is reflected in the idea that while the federal
government assumed that state and municipal bodies would pick up
the burden, these entities assumed the federal government would
42
come to their aid. One result of these presumptuous assumptions was
39. Rhoden, supra note 3, at 392.
40. Id. (quoting BENEDICr ALPER, CLOSING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS, vii-
viii (Y. Bakal ed. 1973).
41. Rhoden, supra note 3, at 376.
42. Id. at 392-93.
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a sharp rise in homelessness among the mentally ill,43 a trend that
continues today. 4
Despite a general lack of coordination between government entities,
many community organizations have established housing for mentally
ill and other service-dependant individuals over the past few decades.
One of the most common examples is the "group home." A group
home is simply a term to describe any small, decentralized,
programmatic dwelling used to support a variety of individuals, from
recovering alcoholics to juvenile offenders. 5
Frequently, development of such programs instigates fierce local
clashes between service organizations and neighborhood residents. 
4
This has been identified as the "Not In My Back Yard" or "NIMBY"
phenomenon, which refers to local residents who, in theory, support
the building of jails, mental hospitals, waste facilities, etc.-so long as
it does not occur where they live. A closer look at the NIMBY
syndrome, as it relates to group housing for the mentally ill, illustrates
the breadth of reaction from residents when questioned as to why they
do not want a group home in their neighborhood. One study revealed
that some people find just about any reason why a group home is
inappropriate for their area. The responses ranged from "we don't
have sidewalks" to "the retarded stay up and scream all night" to "dust
in our neighborhood would be a health hazard to the residents of the
home." ' A mailing sent out by group in Michigan even went as far as
depicting the following reasons given by some residents:
Our road is too wide / Our road is too narrow
It's too dangerous in the country / It's too dangerous in the city
The residents might hurt my kids / My kids might hurt the
residents
Our street ends in a cul-de-sac / Our street is a thru street.49
43. Id. at 376.
44. NAT'L RES. AND TRAINING CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS AND MENTAL ILLNESS,
supra note 4.
45. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 1063 (Aspen Law &
Business 2002).
46. Salsich, Jr., supra note 16, at 417.
47. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 45, at 1063 (citing Salsich, Jr., supra note
16).
48. Id. at 1064.
49. Id.
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It is, on one hand, possible to sympathize with those who do not
want group homes and the like near them and their families. People
are generally frightened of what they do not understand, and people
do not generally understand mental illness, retardation, drug and
alcohol addiction, and other such service-dependant illnesses. Further,
homeowners are generally concerned with the value of their homes
and are wary of welcoming anything into the neighborhood that might
decrease property values. Many homeowners have children and
experience an almost animal instinct to protect them from any
perceived threat.0
On the other hand, however, one must face the painful but necessary
conclusion that if our communities are to provide quality housing
options for large segments of the mentally ill population, NIMBY-ism
can obliterate any hope for the success of the deinstitutionalization
movement. Complicating matters is that the problem is not merely
one of hostility by residents to programs and services for the mentally
ill; it is also the ability to enforce exclusionary zoning policies. Zoning
ordinances, characterized by the segregation of land uses within the
community, have always had an exclusionary bias and have been used
effectively to sustain NIMBY-ism.5" Indeed, the very language of
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,52 the Supreme Court decision
sanctioning modern zoning laws, is tainted with such bias. While the
Court's referral to apartment buildings as "parasites" in the
community 3 cannot be blamed for the future use of zoning regulations
to exclude certain groups of people, 4 it nonetheless created an
atmosphere that enabled this effect.55
As the deinstitutionalization movement gained momentum in the
latter half of the twentieth century, it had to contend with these
pervasive local zoning laws. Within this context, zoning issues did not
center around how land would be used, but who used the land.
50. A few community members protested the formal opening of Zeke's House,
a group home for mentally ill residents located in Washington, D.C., by standing
on the sidewalk in front of the house, carrying signs, and handing out information
about the dangers of pedophilia. None of the residents of Zeke's House had any
history of pedophilia. As witnessed by author in September, 2001. See also infra
Part III.B.
51. Salsich, Jr., supra note 16, at 413-14.
52. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
53. Id.
54. Salsich, Jr., supra note 16, at 415.
55. Id.
56. Kanter, supra note 1, at 960.
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Specifically, seminal issues centered around special-use permits,
"facially neutral" zoning classifications that have a discriminatory
impact on handicapped persons, and ordinances that single out
individuals with handicaps for special treatment.57 Predictably, "efforts
to establish group homes in residential areas often were thwarted by
zoning laws,"58 leading to a concern by the American Planning
Association that "overly restrictive zoning regulations have been a
major stumbling block to the deinstitutionalization movement."59 To
put the matter simply, communities were able to creatively adapt
entrenched zoning laws to make it difficult for certain people to move
into their neighborhoods.
By requiring special-use permits and compliance with other zoning
measures, certain communities could frustrate a person's transition
from the hospital to a decent home, "thereby contributing to the
concentration of mental patients in deteriorating neighborhoods." 60 In
the values clash between providing quality housing for mentally ill
individuals and respecting concerns of certain segments of the
community, zoning laws tipped the balance in favor of the latter group.
As a result, "despite the recognized public policies of
deinstitutionalization and normalization, the development of
community housing opportunities was and continues to be slow and
has not kept pace with the demand for such housing."61
The preceding paragraphs provide the context for the following
analysis of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and the
Community Housing Trust decision. A central theme of the FHAA is
to help ensure handicapped individuals equal access to housing of their
choice.6' As part of this goal, Congress intended "to prohibit the
application of special requirements through land-use regulations,
restrictive covenants, and conditional or special-use permits that have
the effect of limiting the ability of such individuals to live in the
57. Robert L. Schonfeld & Seth P. Stein, Fighting Municipal "Tag-Team": The
Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act and Its Use in Obtaining Access to Housing
for Persons with Disabilities, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 299, 300 (1994) (describing
how these issues have arisen largely as a result of the Fair Housing Amendments
Act).
58. Rhoden, supra note 3, at 393.
59. Salsich, Jr., supra note 16, at 419. The APA is an association of
professional land use planners that host conferences, publish papers, post jobs,
conduct planning research, etc.
60. Rhoden, supra note 3, at 393.
61. Kanter, supra note 1, at 962.
62. Schonfeld & Stein, supra note 57, at 302.
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residence of their choice in the community." 63  The central issue of
Community Housing Trust revolves around a zoning ordinance of the
District of Columbia that served to limit housing options for mentally
ill individuals.64 The clash between this zoning law and the assertion of
rights under the FHAA raises the narrow question of the appropriate
standard to be used in deciding FHAA cases.
III. COMMUNITY HOUSING TRUST V. DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER
AND REGULA TORYAFFAIRS
A. The Fair Housing Act and the Fair Housing Amendments Act
In response to the urban unrest of the 1960s, Congress enacted the
Fair Housing Act, codified in Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of
1968.65 The purpose of the FHA was to prohibit housing
discrimination based upon race, color, religion, or national origin.
66
While this legislation represented a significant advance in civil rights
for many, a number of individuals who had been victims of housing
discrimination were left out.67 Recognizing that people with mental
and physical disabilities had been generally excluded from housing
options due to inaccurate stereotypes, Congress enacted the Fair
Housing Amendments Act in 1988.68 Pursuant to the FHA's broad
policy goal of providing fair housing throughout the United States,69
the FHAA incorporated the words "handicapped" and "family status"
into the above-mentioned protected classes.70 It is important to note
that the FHAA specifically defines "handicapped" persons to include
individuals with both physical and mental impairments. 7' The FHAA
also provides for greater judicial and administrative remedies for
aggrieved persons who sue for violations of the Act.
63. H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 24 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173,
2185.
64. Cmty. Hous. Trust, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 213.
65. Schonfeld & Stein, supra note 57, at 299.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Fair Housing Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1988).
69. Id. § 3601.
70. Id. § 3604(c)-(e).
71. Id. § 3602(h)(1).
72. Schonfeld & Stein, supra note 57, at 302.
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Although this Act was not designed to be a panacea for the nation's
mentally ill, it was a step in the right direction to correct the
shortcomings of the deinstitutionalization movement by facilitating
access to decent community-based housing. Indeed, soon after its
passage, some commentators recognized the great potential of the
FHAA. "The FHA changes . . .will allow community activists, who
have long felt themselves relatively powerless under prior law, to
conduct a far more expansive and aggressive campaign in the fair
housing area."73 The following section will illustrate this point, and
show how the FHAA can be used to combat discriminatory housing
policies.
B. Factual Background of Community Housing Trust
The Community Council for the Homeless at Friendship Place
(CCHFP), the parent group of the Community Housing Trust 4 is a
non-profit organization that works with the homeless population of
Washington, D.C. The mission of CCHFP, located in Ward 3 of
Washington, D.C., is to provide quality case management services to
their homeless clients, providing them with the shelter, transitional
housing, benefits, medical care, and general support they need to
rebuild their lives. In addition to these basic services, CCHFP is also
committed to purchasing and developing houses to serve as permanent
homes for their clients. 6
On March 8, 2001, CCHFP purchased a home in a residential district
of northwest Washington, D.C.77 Christened "Zeke's House," the new
home was to provide housing for five male clients, each living with a
major mental illness. A resident manager would supervise the
community. The potential residents would be subject to a vigorous
screening process. They would live as a community, sharing a common
78kitchen, living room, basement, dining room, and garden.
73. Craig Ulrich, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: New Litigation
Tools for Housing Advocates, 46 Bus. LAw 345 (1990).
74. The Community Housing Trust, established and operated by CCHFP, is
responsible for procuring, developing, and funding housing units for CCHFP
clients.
75. CMTY. COUNCIL FOR THE HOMELESS AT FRIENDSHIP PLACE, PROFILES,
2002: ANNUAL REPORT (2002).
76. Id.
77. Cmty. Hous. Trust, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 212.
78. Id.
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Negative reaction among the Ward 3 community in the wake of the
purchase was swift. Within two weeks, concerned residents had
collected fifty-two signatures opposing the proposed use of the house.7 9
Zeke's House became the first item on the agenda at the next ANC-
3G meeting8 During this tempestuous gathering, a divided roomful of
neighbors eventually agreed to send a letter to the Zoning
Administrator for the District of Columbia to see if anything could be
done to prevent or inhibit CCHFP's plans.8 ' Specifically, the letter
asked whether the five men who would move into Zeke's House would
legally constitute a "family" or members of a "community-based
residential facility" (CBRF) under applicable D.C. zoning regulations.
This determination would be of great significance, as it would
determine whether or not CCHFP, under the current zoning laws,
would be required to obtain a "certificate of occupancy." 82
In response to the letter, CCHFP and the community opposition
submitted their respective views to city officials. CCHFP urged that,
under relevant D.C. Municipal Regulations, the residents of Zeke's
House would indeed constitute a family. A "family" is defined as "one
(1) or more persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption, or not
more than six (6) persons who are not so related, including foster
children, living together as a single housekeeping unit, using certain
rooms and housekeeping facilities in common., 83  The opposition
disagreed, claiming that Zeke's House should be classified as a CBRF,
defined as "a residential facility for persons who have a common need
for treatment, rehabilitation, assistance, or supervision in their daily
living." 4  On September 6, 2001, the Zoning Administrator
determined that under the zoning laws Zeke's House would be a
CBRF, and would thus require a certificate of occupancy if it were to
operate on its proposed site. 85 Three weeks later, CCHFP, believing
79. Id.
80. An ANC, or Advisory Neighborhood Commission, is a local community
council whose purpose is to meet periodically and discuss important issues in the
neighborhood. ANC-3G is in Ward 3.
81. Cmty. Hous. Trust, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 213.
82. Id. Under D.C. zoning laws, any group home falling under the definition of
a "community-based residential facility" is required to obtain a certificate of
occupancy. D.C. MUN. REGS. tit 11, § 199.1 (2004). See also infra note 84 and
accompanying text.
83. D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 11, § 199.1 (2004).
84. Id.
85. Cmty. Hous. Housing Trust, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 214.
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the zoning laws to be in violation of the FHAA, assisted five of their
clients into Zeke's House without a certificate of occupancy.86
Three days after the residents moved in, the Zoning Administrator
personally delivered to Zeke's House a notice of infraction carrying a
five hundred-dollar fine.87  On October 10, however, the D.C.
Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs (DCRA) suspended
the notice for two reasons. First, the DCRA stated that the owners,
CCHFP, had "met the substance of the requirements for health and
safety ... as contemplated in the certificate of occupancy guidelines." s
Second, the mayor of Washington, D.C. was at that time in the process
of organizing a task force to review all regulations applicable to group
homes in the city. The next day CCHFP filed suit against the various
parties, claiming violations of the FHAA.8 9
IV. ANALYSIS OF COMMUNITY HOUSING TRUST
Community Housing Trust v. Department of Consumer & Regulatory
Affairs can be broken down into four salient issues. The first is
whether the case was rendered moot by the subsequent actions of the
DCRA. The second is whether the residents of Zeke's House, and/or
CCHFP generally, suffered any actual harm as a result of the zoning
ordinance. The third is whether the zoning laws of the District of
Columbia are facially discriminatory with respect to persons with
disabilities-that is, do they violate the FHAA. The final issue, and
the one of central import for this Note, is the nature of the standard
that should be employed in granting a municipality an exception to the
FHAA's prohibition of discrimination against mentally ill people.
A. Was the Case Rendered Moot by the Subsequent Actions of the
DCRA?
On December 6, 2001, the DCRA informed CCHFP that Zeke's
House would no longer need to obtain a certificate of occupancy.9
Pursuant to this action, DCRA argued at a status conference hearing
that the case was now moot. 91 This argument was rejected, however,
86. Id. at 215.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 216.
89. Id.
90. Cmty. Hous. Trust, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 216.
91. Id.
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prompting DCRA to file a motion for summary judgment. In
analyzing this motion, the D.C. District Court followed the principle
laid down by the Supreme Court in County of Los Angeles v. Davis.9 2
The Court held that where a defendant voluntarily ceases his
(potentially) illegal conduct, the action is not rendered moot unless (1)
there is no reasonable expectation that the conduct will occur again
and (2) the interceding actions by the defendant have completely and
irrevocably eliminated any ill effects of the alleged violation. 93 In
Community Housing Trust, the district court concluded that neither
prong of the above standard was met. In particular, the court stressed
that "defendants have not shown that the zoning problems that
plagued Zeke's House will not plague future establishments. '" 94
This conclusion is instructive and has consequences that reach far
beyond Zeke's House. As noted previously, certain zoning laws have
played a major role in limiting housing options for the disabled,
particularly the mentally ill. They can stand as silent and furtive
barriers, frustrating the development of decent housing for the
disabled. If a municipality is permitted to "threaten" various
individuals and organizations with zoning laws that violate the FHAA,
only to retract its position if and when the individual or organization
exerts a sustained effort to confront it, genuine progress toward fair
housing is frustrated. By holding that DCRA's reversal did not render
the case moot, the court compelled the city to confront its own
discriminatory policies.
B. Did the Residents of Zeke's House, or CCHFP Generally, Suffer
Any Actual Harm?
Whether CCHFP or the residents of Zeke's House actually suffered
harm is an issue of standing. Under the D.C. zoning laws, if a home is
classified as a CBRF, it must then be further classified into one of
seven categories. 95 Zeke's House does not fit neatly into any of these
categories, but most closely approximates a "community residence
facility." 96 A community residence facility must be licensed by the city
92. County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (1979).
93. Id. at 631.
94. Cmty. Hous. Trust, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 219-20.
95. D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 11, § 199.1 (1995). The seven categories are: (1) adult
rehabilitation home; (2) community residence facility; (3) emergency shelter; (4)
health care facility; (5) substance abusers home; (6) youth rehabilitation home; and
(7) youth residential care home. Id.
96. Cmty. Hous. Trust, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 214.
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to operate; this requirement in turn triggers a host of additional
regulations that must then be met. If at any time any of these
requirements are not met, the license can be revoked. If the license is
revoked, the certificate of occupancy can also be taken away, causing
the residents to lose their home.97
One such requirement of the license is that the facility be staffed
with twenty-four-hour supervision. Zeke's House, like other housing
programs run by CCHFP, is designed to efficiently promote the
independence and welfare of high-functioning individuals who also
happen to live with a mental illness. While a resident manager would
be present in the evening and throughout the night, he would not be
there during the day, nor would he need to be.98 The case management
requirements of CCHFP generally require residents to be active during
the day, involved in structured programs run by other organizations
similar to CCHFP.99 Some residents have the opportunity to attend
job readiness programs enabling them to secure future employment. If
there are any problems, CCHFP staff can be reached instantly, by the
residents or the community, at CCHFP's nearby office from eight a.m.
to roughly six p.m.100
The requirement of such round-the-clock supervision, therefore, is
not well suited for a housing program like Zeke's House.' Indeed, in
a letter to the executive director of CCHFP, the Director of the D.C.
Mental Health Commission stated that Zeke's House does not need a
license. °2 By forcing Zeke's House into a CBRF classification, the city
had attempted to impose additional burdens that could not have been
met absent "a fundamental alteration of their supportive housing
model."'0 3 In sum, this classification was another way for the zoning
laws to silently and insidiously frustrate bona fide efforts to establish
quality housing options for mentally ill individuals. The court
combined the above reasoning with the fees and extensive inspections
involved to reject DCRA's contention that the discriminatory laws
were not burdensome enough to trigger a violation of the FHAA. In
other words, the court found that Community Housing Trust had
standing to pursue the suit.
97. Id. at 214-15.
98. Id. at 215.
99. Interview with Wendy Guyton, MSW, Community Council for the
Homeless at Friendship Place, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 22, 2003).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Cmty. Hous. Trust, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 215.
103. Id. at 215.
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C. Are the Zoning Laws of the District Facially Discriminatory Within
the Meaning of the FHAA?
CCHFP argued that Title 11 of the D.C. Municipal Regulations
facially discriminates on the basis of an FHAA-protected
characteristic. The court first articulated that, based on the definition
of "handicapped" as stipulated in § 3602(h)(1) of the FHAA, the
residents of Zeke's House are indeed members of a protected class
°'04
The court noted the differential treatment by pointing out that the
zoning laws require a CBRF to obtain a certificate of occupancy, while
a "family" does not need a certificate. 5
CCHFP illustrated the issue with the following analogy. Imagine
two houses on a block. One is populated by six nineteen-year-old
college students. The other is populated by six handicapped persons.
Title 11 says that the first group does not need a certificate, but the
latter group, because of a "common need for treatment, rehabilitation,
assistance, or supervision in their daily living" does.' 6 The court
concluded that, indeed, the zoning laws in question do apply different
standards to different groups on the basis of their disability. °7 The
court further noted that this is so even though the zoning laws in
question make no specific reference to "disability."' 0' 8 The court found
that because a protected group had been subjected to expressly
differential treatment, a prima facie case for an FHAA violation was
satisfied.' 9
D. What Standard Should Be Used in Making a Final Determination of
an FHAA Violation?
The mere fact that a zoning law may be discriminatory on its face or
as applied to a certain group or individual does not necessarily mean
that the law actually violates the FHAA. Indeed, exceptions to the
FHAA allow extra restrictions and burdens to be placed on group
homes and other housing arrangements in certain situations,
prompting an FHAA claim to go through further analysis." These
exceptions are derived from the FHAA provision stating "[n]othing in
104. Id. at 221.
105. D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 11, § 3202.1 (2004).
106. 257 F. Supp. 2d at 222 (quoting D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 11, § 199.1 (2004)).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1995).
110. Cmty. Hous. Trust, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 228.
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this subsection requires that a dwelling be made available to an
individual whose tenancy would constitute a direct threat to the health
and safety of other individuals or whose tenancy would result in
substantial physical damage to the property of others..'''' The
following legislative history on this section gives the rationale for this
nebulous permutation in the law:
While the Committee does not foresee that the tenancy of any
individual with handicaps would impose any risk, much less a
significant risk, to the health or safety of others by the status of
being handicapped, the Committee added this provision to allay
the fears of those who believe that the non-discrimination
provisions of this Act could force landlords and owners to rent
or sell to individuals whose tenancies pose such a risk.
In other words, Congress provided that discriminatory zoning laws
and other regulations against handicapped individuals would not
violate the FHAA, so long as these individuals constituted a "direct
threat." The unresolved question, then, is posed: With respect to this
exception, what standard should be used to determine if the imposition
of a special restriction or other discriminatory law violates the FHAA?
The answer to this question reaches the heart of Community Housing
Trust. As the court stated, "The D.C. Circuit has not adopted a
standard of review for determining when special restrictions are
warranted under the FHAA, and the circuits are split."'' 3  For
example, the Eighth Circuit follows the notion that discrimination
against handicapped individuals is permissible so long as the
governmental body promulgating the rule has a rational reason for
doing so. The Sixth and Tenth Circuits, however, require a higher
standard."5
1. Eighth Circuit Standard
The method of analysis used by the Eighth Circuit employs an
inappropriately low standard of review. A brief evaluation of a recent
111. Fair Housing Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(9) (2001).
112. H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 28 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173,
2189.
113. Cmty. Hous. Trust, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 228.
114. See generally Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, 77 F.3d 249 (8th Cir.
1996); Familystyle of St. Paul v. City of St. Paul, 923 F.2d 91, 94 (8th Cir. 1991).
115. See generally Bangerter v. Orem City Corp. 46 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1995);
Marbrunak, Inc. v. City of Stow, 974 F.2d 43 (6th Cir. 1992).
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decision illustrates this point. In Oxford House-C v. City of St.
Louis,"6 the issue surrounded the number of men who could live in a
supportive group home for recovering alcoholics. The men who reside
in Oxford Houses, which have numerous successful programs
nationwide, are required to live in a community, attend meetings, work
if possible, and remain sober."7  Residents who relapse are
immediately removed from the community and placed in inpatient
rehabilitation programs. " ' In order to remain economically viable,
Oxford Houses typically house six to fifteen members."9 The Oxford
House at issue in this case, however, was in a neighborhood where
zoning laws required group homes to have eight or fewer residents.1
20
In a terse opinion, the court stated that "[e]ven if the eight-person rule
causes some financial hardship for Oxford Houses, however, the rule
does not violate the Fair Housing Act if the City had a rational basis





The court's language suggests that the Eighth Circuit would treat an
FHAA claim as they would an equal protection claim under the
Constitution. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,122 for
example, the Supreme Court concluded that handicapped individuals
do not merit heightened scrutiny review in challenging discriminatory
laws on equal protection grounds.23 They instead applied a minimal
scrutiny standard, requiring only that the laws have a rational relation
to a legitimate governmental purpose to pass constitutional muster.
2 4
By similarly demanding that the regulating body simply have a rational
basis for promulgating the rule, the Eighth Circuit also employs this
minimal standard of review. The concern with this approach, of
course, is that "if a court uses a minimal scrutiny standard of review, it
will look very deferentially at the government action at issue, would
require less justification for it, and would be relatively unwilling and
unlikely to strike down the action.'
' 25
116. See Oxford House-C, 77 F.3d at 251.
117. Oxford House, Questions and Answers, at http://www.oxfordhouse.org
(last visited May 12, 2005).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See Oxford House-C, 77 F.3d at 251.
121. Id. at 252.
122. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
123. Id. at 446.
124. Id.
125. WILLIAM KAPLIN, CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 56
(1992).
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It is elementary, of course, that the Eighth Circuit's analysis of the
case would be exactly correct if the matter at hand was subject only to
equal protection analysis. But this is not the case. The existence of the
FHAA indicates a greater need to specifically protect, by statute,
housing rights for handicapped individuals. Because "[t]he Fair
Housing Amendments Act ... is a clear pronouncement of a national
commitment to end the unnecessary exclusion of persons with
handicaps from the American mainstream,"'12 6 the law clearly implies
that handicapped individuals should receive more protection from the
statute then they would under an equal protection analysis. Indeed,
the mere use of the equal protection rational basis standard runs
contrary to the FHAA's central purpose, and is therefore an
inadequately low standard to use when determining whether or not a
discriminatory housing law may stand.
In addition, in justifying their holding in Oxford House-C, the
Eighth Circuit focused solely on the concerns of the community and
not the needs of the handicapped residents.127 Specifically, the court
found that decreasing congestion, traffic, and noise in residential areas
all serve the city's legitimate interest."" Also, the court did not take
seriously the charge that the city's actions were motivated by bias
against and stereotypes of recovering alcoholics.1 29 Brushing off this
insinuation, the court stated, "We believe the City's enforcement
actions were lawful regardless of whether some City officials harbor
prejudice or unfounded fears about recovering addicts." 1  This
language indicates that the Eighth Circuit is far too dismissive of a
large motivating factor behind the FHAA.
The legislative history reveals that Congress was concerned about
the role of stereotypes in preventing handicapped individuals from
obtaining decent housing. The House Report of June 17, 1988 is
replete with this concern. Early in the report, the drafters state
"[p]rohibiting discrimination against individuals with handicaps is a
major step in changing the stereotypes that have served to exclude
them from American life. These persons have been denied housing
because of misperceptions, ignorance, and outright prejudice."''
126. H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 18 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173,
2179.




131. H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 18 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2179.
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Shortly after, the report proclaims that the FHAA "repudiates the use
of stereotypes and ignorance, and mandates that persons with
handicaps be considered as individuals. Generalized perceptions
about disabilities and unfounded speculations about threats to safety
are specifically rejected as grounds to justify exclusion.' 132
Moreover, the House makes a point to emphasize that their
intention to eradicate unfounded bias extends to mentally ill
individuals as well. With specific regard to the provision that FHAA
protection does not extend to individuals whose tenancy would pose a
substantial risk to others, 33 the House pronounces that
[g]eneralized assumption, subjective fears, and speculation are
insufficient to prove the requisite direct threat to others. In the
case of a person with mental illness, for example, there must be
objective evidence from the person's prior behavior that the
person has committed overt acts which caused harm or which
directly threatened harm.
134
Finally, the report also addresses the concern of restrictive zoning
laws. It implies that these laws sometimes prevent handicapped
persons from obtaining quality housing while purporting to exist for
"their own good." In a clear attack on such zoning regulations, the
report states,
Another method of making housing unavailable to people with
disabilities has been the application or enforcement of otherwise
neutral rules and regulations on health, safety, and land-use in a
manner which discriminates against people with disabilities.
Such discrimination often results from false or over-protective
assumptions about the needs of handicapped people, as well as
unfounded fears of difficulties about the problems that their
tenancies may pose. These and similar practices would be
prohibited. 135
This legislative history of the FHAA indicates that Congress was
indeed concerned about prejudice and unfounded fears against
handicapped individuals, and that this concern was a major driving
force in its promulgation. For the Eighth Circuit to be so dismissive of
this issue indicates a fundamental misunderstanding of the law. In
short, Oxford House-C illustrates why Community Housing Trust is
good law. The mere existence of the FHAA indicates that something
132. Id.
133. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(9).
134. H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 29 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2190.
135. Id. at 24, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2185.
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more than minimal rational basis review must be required in
evaluating discriminatory zoning laws.
2. The Sixth and Tenth Circuits
In Marbrunak, Inc. v. City of Stow, Ohio,136 the Sixth Circuit faced a
situation factually similar to Community Housing Trust. With the
assistance of a state grant, several families who had adult children with
mental disabilities joined together to create a housing program for
their children.'37 This house would not need to be licensed by the state
in order to function."' They then purchased a home situated in a
neighborhood zoned for single-family use only. 39 At this point the city
intervened. Conceding that the use of the house would indeed
constitute "family use," the city nonetheless informed the families that
they would need to comply with other zoning regulations because the
140house would be occupied by persons with developmental disabilities.
These extra requirements, not imposed on other family dwellings, were
both a substantial inconvenience and an added expense. For example,
the regulations required all doors to have push bars and lighted exit
signs, a whole-house sprinkler system, fire extinguishers every thirty
feet, and special fire retardant wall and floor coverings, to name a
few. 41 While at first glance these regulations may strike the reader as
sensible safety precautions, they have the additional effect of
increasing the cost of the house and the time it would take to prepare
it for the waiting residents. Moreover, and of central relevance here,
while the imposition of these restrictions may have been appropriate
for certain groups of disabled persons, they were unnecessary for these
individuals. One of the families brought suit, claiming that the zoning
ordinances in question violated the FHAA.
In deciding the case, the Sixth Circuit referred to the legislative
history of the FHAA, articulating how Congress had "an intent that
the prohibition against discrimination extend to zoning practices and
enforcement of otherwise neutral safety regulations that have the
effect of limiting the ability of handicapped individuals to live in the
residence of their choice.' ' 142 They then went on to explain how the
136. Marbrunak, Inc., v. City of Stow, 974 F.2d 43 (6th Cir. 1992).




141. Marbrunak, 974 F.2d at 45 n.1.
142. Id. at 45.
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discriminatory zoning regulations in question, although permissible in
some circumstances, were simply not allowable in this situation.143 For
example, the city did not make any attempt to show why special fire
alarms were necessary for these individuals, none of whom were
hearing impaired. Further, the city made no showing of why the doors
currently in the home were improper for the prospective residents.
14
Following this logic, the court then pronounced the standard for this
particular situation. With respect to discriminatory housing
regulations, the city "may impose standards which are different from
those to which it subjects the general population, so long as that
protection is demonstrated to be warranted by the unique and specific
needs and abilities of those handicapped persons.'
45
By so holding, the Sixth Circuit articulated a standard that brings the
needs of the individual handicapped person to the forefront of the
FHAA inquiry. The court recognized that zoning regulations-even
benign, paternalistic ones that seemingly benefit handicapped
people-will not be tolerated if they blindly serve to make housing
options for such people significantly more difficult. This standard
clearly evidences the court's opinion that the FHAA dictates a higher
level of justification for such regulations than merely a rational basis.
To drive home the point that in this case the standard had not been
met, the court concluded that "the expense that would result from
complying with needless safety requirements amounts to an onerous
burden which has the effect of limiting the ability of these handicapped
individuals to live in the residence of their choice.'
146
Three years later, in 1995, the Tenth Circuit produced a similar
holding in Bangerter v. Orem City Corp.,147 a factually analogous case.
The issue in this case centered around the multiple obligations
imposed by the requirement of a "conditional use permit" for a group
home for mentally handicapped people. The district court held that,
while the zoning regulations were facially discriminatory, they
nonetheless passed FHAA muster because they were rationally related
to the legitimate governmental purpose of integrating handicapped
persons into mainstream society.)4  The Tenth Circuit sharply
criticized this result: "[T]he use of an Equal Protection analysis is
143. Id. at 47.
144. Id.
145. Id. (emphasis added).
146. Marbrunak, 974 F.2d at 48.
147. Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1995).
148. Id. at 1497.
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misplaced here because this case involves a federal statute and not the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . the FHAA specifically makes the
handicapped a protected class for purposes of a statutory claim . . .
even if they are not a protected class for constitutional purposes."''4 9 In
the end, the court concluded that "the district court utilized the wrong
legal standard in applying the FHAA."'"5
In discussing what standard to apply in this case, the Tenth Circuit
panel stated that the FHAA permits housing discrimination in two
general circumstances. First, discrimination is warranted where one's
tenancy would pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other
neighboring residents.'5' Second, discrimination is permitted where it
will in fact serve the actual needs of the handicapped person. As the
court logically pointed out, "[Tihe FHAA should not be interpreted to
preclude special restrictions upon the disabled that are actually
beneficial to, rather than discriminatory against, the handicapped.'
5 2
In both situations, however, careful consideration must be given to the
needs and abilities of the actual handicapped persons in question; blind
allegiance to stereotypes will not suffice. With regard to public safety
issues, "[R]estrictions predicated on public safety cannot be based on
stereotypes about the handicapped, but must be tailored to
particularized concerns about individual residents. '53 As for
restrictions purporting to benefit the handicapped person, these must
also be individually tailored to produce some discernable benefit to the
particular handicapped people in question. In addition, these benefits
must outweigh any corresponding burdens arising because of the
discriminatory regulation. In effect, the Bangerter court adopted the
Marbrunak standard, while specifically rejecting the Eighth Circuit's
approach in Oxford House.
3. Community Housing Trust Court Agrees on Higher Standard
The Community Housing Trust court clearly states that it supports
the more reasoned and searching analysis employed by the Sixth and
Tenth Circuits when faced with an FHAA claim. They preface their
decision to follow these circuits by reviewing Supreme Court
jurisprudence and announcing, "Traditionally, courts have broadly
149. Id. at 1503.
150. Id. at 1500.
151. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(9).
152. Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1504.
153. Id. at 1503.
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interpreted the FHA, so as to fully effectuate Congress' remedial
purpose.15 4 Bringing this idea to bear on the case before them, the
court continued, "The Supreme Court has held that the FHAA should
be afforded the same generous construction as the original Act. 'S
The court then cited to a Seventh Circuit decision, which stated that
the FHAA is "a broad mandate to eliminate discrimination against
and equalize housing opportunities for disabled individuals.
156
With the FHAA thus characterized, the court went on to articulate
their standard for determining when facially discriminatory housing
laws violate this Act. Recognizing the approach taken by the Sixth and
Tenth Circuits as the proper standard when deciding FHAA cases, the
court stated that mere rational basis review is not enough. 5 7 The
differential treatment must be either warranted by the "unique and
special needs and abilities of those handicapped persons to whom the
regulations apply,"'' 8 or justified by legitimate (i.e. real and not just
stereotypical) safety concerns posed by their residing in the
neighborhood.159 By so holding, the District of Columbia joined a
growing number of jurisdictions in adopting a more scrutinizing level
of review regarding violations of the FHAA. This important decision
gives housing advocates for all disabled individuals, particularly the
mentally ill, a powerful tool in housing discrimination cases.
V. COMMUNITY HOUSING TRUST AND SOCIAL POLICY
The FHAA is a broad mandate to remove barriers to housing
options for handicapped persons and should be liberally construed in
favor of assisting such people to find housing.' 6° The Act endeavors to
change stereotypes based on misperception, ignorance, and prejudice
154. Community Housing Trust, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 220; see also Haven's Realty
Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372-74 (1982); Trafficante v. Metro Life Ins. Co.,
409 U.S. 205, 209, 212 (1972).
155. 257 F. Supp. 2d at 220; see also City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514
U.S. 725, 731 (1995).
156. Bronk v. Ineichen, 54 F.3d 425, at 428 (7th Cir. 1995).
157. Cmty. Hous. Trust, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 229.
158. Id. at 228.
159. Id. at 229.
160. Schonfeld & Stein, supra note 57, at 304.
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about the handicapped, including persons living with mental illness.6 1
One such stereotype about mentally ill individuals is that they are
prone to violence and thus a danger to any community. While
numerous studies historically conclude mentally ill people are more
prone to violence than the "general community,"' 162 some modern
scholarship applies a more searching inquiry and arrives at a different
conclusion. The following two studies provide fresh insight into this
complex issue.
In 2002, Duke University Medical Center conducted a study to
analyze the link between mental illness and violent behavior.6 This
study involved 802 seriously mentally ill individuals' 64 living in four
different states.1 6 Recognizing the need for a more holistic approach
to the problem, the study postulates "[m]ore informed and nuanced
models are needed to elucidate how and why violent behavior occurs
in individuals with mental illness who have certain characteristics and
experiences., 66 In analyzing the problem, the study considers three
"risk factor subgroups" which often relate to experiencing life with
mental illness: a history of violent victimization, substance abuse, and
exposure to community violence.6 7 The study reveals that individuals
with none or only one risk factor had predicated probabilities of
violence close to the national average for the general population.'
68
However, those with two or three of these risk factors exhibited violent
behavior far out of proportion with the general population.' 69 The
study concludes that "[p]sychopathy per se seldom leads to
161. H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 18 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173,
2179.
162. See generally L. Sosowski, Explaining the Increased Arrest Rate Among
Mental Patients: a Cautionary Note, 137 AM. J. PSYCH. 1602 (1980); J. Rabkin,
Criminal Behavior of Discharged Mental Patients: A Critical Appraisal of the
Research, 86 PSYCH. BULLETIN 1 (1979).
163. Jeffery W. Swanson et al., The Social-Environmental Context of Violent
Behavior in Persons Treated for Severe Mental Illness, 92 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH
1523 (2002).
164. All participants in the study were currently receiving treatment for their
mental illness. Id. at 1529.
165. Id. at 1523.
166. Id. at 1528.
167. Id.
168. Swanson et al., supra note 163, at 1528.
169. Id.
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assaultiveness, but it may converge with other risk factors that,
together, significantly increase the likelihood of violent behavior."'' °
In an article regarding the study, Dr. Jeffery Swanson discusses how
the results relate to the overall treatment of the mentally ill. "While
the illness certainly plays a role, the risk factors we examined
compound the illness in a way that makes violence more probable.
Those risk factors should be a large part of the focus of treatment and
services for persons with mental illness and a history of violence. ''71
Dr. Swanson also notes that much of the violence caused by people
with mental illness can be prevented with the proper resources.'72 "Yet
many individuals with serious and disabling psychiatric disorders are
not receiving the treatment and support that might enable them to live
productive lives in the community."'73 Another author of the study, Dr.
Marvin Swartz, discusses the results in light of the need to provide
quality housing options for mentally ill people, stating, "If we're
worried about violence among people with serious mental illness, we
need to pay far more attention to finding safe housing in decent
neighborhoods. ,1
74
The message from the Duke Medical Center study is clear-it is not
enough to simply say, with no further analysis, that people with mental
illness are more prone to violence than those in the general
population. Rather, the inquiry should begin by understanding that
people with mental illnesses, properly treated, do not pose an
increased danger to the community merely because of their
psychopathy. Only when such individuals are exposed to certain risk
factors does violent behavior tend to increase. If these risk factors
(victimization, substance abuse, and exposure to community violence)
are addressed and dealt with by organizations, like CCHFP, that serve
the mentally ill, then the result is a safer community for all,
nonhandicapped and handicapped alike. Again, as the Duke study
indicates, mentally ill persons with none or one risk factor have similar
propensities to violence as the general population.
A three-site MacArthur Foundation study reached similar results.
This study concluded that discharged psychiatric patients, who were
properly medicated and without current substance abuse problems,
170. Id. at 1523.
171. Tracy Koepke, Three Risk Factors Cited in Violent Behavior Among People




175. Swanson et al., supra note 163, at 1529.
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had about the same incidence of violent behavior as other individuals
in the same neighborhoods. ' The logical conclusion is that this is a
strong argument for providing more services targeted specifically to
persons who suffer from both mental illness and addiction. This active
targeting is important because these individuals are less likely to
comply voluntarily with conventional outpatient treatment. 7' Again,
this is exactly what organizations like CCHFP attempt to do, and why
access to quality housing is so important in the overall treatment of
people with mental illness. The deinstitutionalization movement, if it
is to survive and flourish, depends on such community organizations.
Likewise, if organizations like CCHFP are to be successful with the
actual front-line work envisioned by the movement, they will depend
on decisions like Community Housing Trust.
CONCLUSION
Individuals with mental disabilities have a long history of inadequate
housing."" Large numbers of mentally ill people live on the streets
179
or in dangerous neighborhoods. 8  This state of affairs led some
commentators in the 1980s to conclude that the deinstitutionalization
movement had utterly failed."' The simple truth was that hospitals
were releasing their patients into communities that did not have the
housing resources to accommodate them. 8 2 Overly restrictive zoning
regulations further frustrated the deinstitutionalization movement.
183
Recognizing the need to intervene, Congress in 1988 passed the Fair
Housing Amendments Ac18
176. H.J. Steadman et al., Violence by People Discharged from Acute Psychiatric
Inpatient Facilities and by Others in the Same Neighborhood, 55 ARCH. GEN.
PSYCH. 393-401 (1998).
177. Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Violence and Severe Mental Disorder in Clinical
and Community Populations: The Effects of Psychotic Symptoms, Comorbidity,
and Lack of Treatment, 60 PSYCHIATRY 1-22 (1997).
178. Kanter, supra note 1, at 929.
179. NAT'L RES. AND TRAINING CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS AND MENTAL ILLNESS,
supra note 4.
180. Kanter, supra note 1, at 929.
181. Rhoden, supra note 3, at 392.
182. Id.
183. Salsich, Jr., supra note 16, at 419.
184. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2000).
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In this Act, Congress extended its policy to provide "for fair housing
throughout the United States' '85 to handicapped persons, including the
mentally ill. The Act was immediately recognized as a potentially
powerful tool for fair housing advocates. 18 A particular goal of the
FHAA was to eliminate certain restrictive zoning regulations that had
the effect of denying housing to handicapped people."' Built into the
Act, however, exists a subtle exception that renders the FHAA
inapplicable in situations where the prospective tenant will pose a
"direct threat" to the safety of the community. '8 In light of this
language, lower courts have applied the FHAA to discriminatory
zoning regulations with varying rigor. The Eighth Circuit, in Oxford
House-C v. City of St. Louis, applied an analysis tantamount to mere
rational basis review189 in concluding that a zoning ordinance, though
facially discriminatory to handicapped persons, did not violate the
FHAA.'9 Other courts have recognized that in enacting the FHAA,
Congress intended to provide special protection to handicapped
people, including the mentally ill, in their pursuit of quality housing.
With their decisions in Marbrunak Inc., v. City of Stow,'9' and
Bangerter v. Orem City Corp.,' 92 the Sixth and Tenth Circuits,
respectively, applied a more searching review, declaring that
discriminatory zoning regulations may only survive FHAA scrutiny if
they are "tailored to particularized concerns about individual
residents."'93
In Community Housing Trust v. Department of Consumer &
Regulatory Affairs, the District Court for the District of Columbia
rejected the Eighth Circuit's approach, choosing to side with the
growing majority of courts who demand a higher standard.' 94 In so
doing, the court continued a trend of decisions that are breathing life
into the FHAA. These decisions may also reflect a growing
acceptance of the mentally ill within our communities, as
misperceptions regarding mental illness and violent behavior are
185. 42 U.S.C. § 3601.
186. Ulrich, supra note 73, at 345.
187. Schonfeld & Stein, supra note 57, at 323.
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